Abstract

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Title “Making Angry Public Rhetorics Work Better for a Global ‘Us’”.

Abstract In the twenty-first century, as throughout human history, anger has played a pivotal role in governance and international affairs. This essay contributes to the substantial scholarly literature on public emotion by summarizing an integrative analysis of public anger built both on multi-disciplinary literatures theorizing emotion and upon three case studies surrounding the attacks now commonly labelled “9/11.” Examples from the rhetorics of Osama bin Laden, President George W. Bush, and Susan Sontag illustrate the predispositional complex of anger well, because the elements of that complex are evident among all three rhetorics, despite the dramatic differences in culture, ideology, and positionality of the rhetors from whom they emanate. The essay concludes by urging the development of conditions and rhetorical practices that would enable global anger to serve its valuable adjudicatory functions rather than to reprise endlessly its function of rallying peoples to attack each other.

Keywords anger, emotion, appraisal, action tendencies, 9/11.
In the twenty-first century, as throughout human history, anger has played a pivotal role in governance and international affairs. This essay contributes to the substantial scholarly literature on public emotion by summarizing an integrative analysis of public anger built both on multi-disciplinary literatures theorizing emotion and upon three case studies surrounding the attacks now commonly labelled “9/11.” Examples from the rhetorics of Osama bin Laden, President George W. Bush, and Susan Sontag illustrate the predispositional complex of anger well, because the elements of that complex are evident among all three rhetorics, despite the dramatic differences in culture, ideology, and positionality of the rhetors from whom they emanate. The essay concludes by urging the development of conditions and rhetorical practices that would enable global anger to serve its valuable adjudicatory functions rather than to reprise endlessly its function of rallying peoples to attack each other.

Deriving an Integrative Theory of Public Emotion

The literature on emotion has for decades been divided between those who view emotion as an individual-level phenomenon and those who respond that emotion

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is almost purely a culturally derived set of practices. For the former, there are a set of universal core emotions that can be readily identified as embodied and distinct from each other (“discrete”) and for the latter, universals smack of Platonic categories that are always hegemonic constructions. Further, they argue, it is impossible to distinguish specific emotions one from another, especially given that different cultures parse emotion words in different ways.

This dichotomous frame can be superseded with a view that accounts for the full range of evidence and insights amassed by these differing scholars. Rather than casting emotions as either discrete, mechanistic universals or as radically particular cultural idiosyncrasies, emotions are better framed as somewhat diffuse cloud-like assemblages. Such complexes are formed by mutually activating components constituted as predisposed densities rather than by machine-like, purpose-built gears and levers. The commonly identified components of emotions include appraisal cues, subjective experiences, physiological activations, and action tendencies.

Comparing emotions to clouds highlights how one can identify categories that are imprecisely bounded but nonetheless usefully identifiable. Clouds can be purposefully categorized as cumulonimbus and cirrus, while also admitting that many cloudscapes involve shifting, interpenetrating displays of varying forms. Likewise, anger is not a self-identical thing, but a palette of diffusely bounded shades: hate, ire, miffed, furious, annoyed, fuming, etc. (or e.g., among the Ifaluk, “song,” “linger-ringer,” “nguch,” “tang”). This fuzzy notion of what a category can be also accounts for the evidence that emotion displays vary not only across cultures but also within cultures for differently positioned persons and through time.

Such an integrative view requires attending to emotions at both the individual and the social level. Ignoring the embodiment of emotions at the individual level precludes understanding the predispositional tendencies of public emotion. That ignorance is too costly if it reinforces unrealistic hopes for the eradication of emotion in favor of reason or if it facilitates the deployment of rhetorics that cannot possibly persuade people who have particularly embodied predispositions.

On the other hand, ignoring the social level obscures why emotions appear in distinctive ways shaped by cultures and ideologies. Attending to the sociality of emotion also reveals what emotions do. They not only provide internal cues, but also regulate relations. My tears are not needed to tell me I am unhappy: they are a call for help or a plea for you to change what is harming me. My anger is not just an internal message to myself (“do something about the blockage of your goals”), but also a message to you: “change your behavior, or else!”

As human social interactions expand from the interpersonal to collective levels, language becomes more pivotal. Collectives require the articulation of identities and shared goals in the explicit and widely shareable form of language. Conse-

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2 See, for example, multiple perspectives in Michael Potegal, Gerhard Stemmler, and Charles Spielberger (Eds.) *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes* (New York: Springer, 2010).

sequently, to the extent that discourse has inherent structuring dynamics, these dynamics will shape public emotions.

**Components of Emotion Illustrated by Anger**

An integrative theory of public emotion therefore requires analyses to attend to social functions, the fuzzy components that constitute an emotion, and the role of the structure of language. These theoretical dimensions of emotions can be more fully explained by examining their instantiations in anger.

**The Social Functions of Anger**

Scholars studying anger from multiple perspectives have recognized anger as integral to the social allocation of resources. Cultural scholars have emphasized how public displays of anger allow oppressed groups to contest the inequitable distribution of social goods, or have noted how the privilege to display anger enables members of powerful groups to maintain dominance. Evolutionary scholars have pointed to the same social function. For example, Petersen and colleagues describe anger as one of the “social emotions,” which “evolved for successfully solving recurrent adaptive problems of group living—such as sharing, exploitation, coalitions, power relations, hierarchy, collective action, punishing norm violators and managing intergroup relation.” Specifically, they argue that the function of anger “is to defend against exploitation and bargain for better treatment.” Because humans employ normative systems for managing such conflicts, evolutionary theorists tend to view the particular displays of anger as focused around the management of “rule violations.”

The details of this mechanism for social adjudication were first described by an anthropologist, Catherine Lutz, in her study in Micronesia. On her account, among the Ifaluk, “to become justifiably angry [song] is to advance the possibilities for peace and well-being on the island, for it is to identify instances of behavior that threaten the moral order.” She identified a social script by which anger-based interactions achieved this function: “(1) there is a rule or value violation, (2) it is pointed out by someone, (3) who simultaneously calls for the condemnation of the act, and

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(4) the perpetrator reacts in fear to that anger, (5) am ending his or her ways.”

Evidence that anger manifests a similar pattern in Western cultures is provided by descriptions of anger in the Middle Ages of Europe offered by the historians in a pioneering collection, *Anger’s Past*. Those essays identify the same functions and performance features noted by Lutz, though they recognize a wider range of reactions to anger displays than Lutz’s idealized fear and compliance.

A view of emotions as variable assemblages of fuzzy components should lead one to expect some plurivocity in the functions of an emotion. Anger’s function of regulating internal relations seems to be paired with a more troubling function, the influencing of relations with out-groups. Scholars in international relations have highlighted how, in out-group relations, anger serves to rally groups to display or execute threats against others.

Attending to these dual functions of anger highlights problems inherent to the deployment of anger as a mechanism to try to gain normatively based distributions of resources across the globe. Global peoples don’t necessarily share norms to be adjudicated, and we don’t identify each other as members of in-groups, but rather as out-groups. Consequently, anger cannot presently achieve its ameliorative function of normatively based resource distribution, but only its threat-based function. Additional insights can be gained by attending to the components that arise to serve the functions of anger.

**The Components of Public Anger**

All four components of an emotion—appraisal cues, subjective experiences, physiological activations, and action tendencies—will have impact on its public manifestation. However, when analyzing specific cases of public emotion, real-time measurement of physiological components of representative samples of publics seems impossible. Similarly, the fine-grained nature of subjective response dictates a constrained role for examinations of subjective experience in most studies of public emotion. In contrast, attention to appraisal cues and action tendencies are mandatory for analyses of public emotion that seek to inform political action with long-term horizons.

**Appraisal Cues:** Appraisal cues are the perceived conditions and normative warrants

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that predispositionally elicit particular categories of actions. Appraisal-based theories of emotion have dominated the humanities at least since Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. The research literature accumulated since Aristotle describes appraisals related to anger as requiring perceptions that 1) negative events have occurred that 2) result from the blameworthy actions of others, and 3) one has a reasonably high likelihood of controlling the others’ behavior, and 4) a relatively high certainty about the events and their cause. When anger is circulated publically, these shared perceptions produce a predisposition toward a particular script. That script, however, is also shaped by anger’s tendencies toward action.

**Action Tendencies**: The action tendencies of emotions can be defined as relatively broad categories of behavior that are predispositionally induced with the activation of a particular emotional assemblage. Scholars from multiple disciplines have identified anger’s action tendencies as including both particular embodied movement and cognitive biases. Angry body movement includes activation (as opposed to stilling, as in sorrow), approach orientation (as opposed to fleeing, as in fear), and antagonism or attack. The cognitive biases of anger are summed up in the cliché “blinded by rage.” They include excessive optimism, high certainty, and cognitive narrowing. The latter involves the resort to familiar categories and routines (including stereotypes), rather than openness to searching for novel information or ideas (which, for contrast, are more likely to be encouraged by some forms of happiness and mild versions of sadness).

These action-steering tendencies of anger skew the appraisal cues for public emotion in particular directions identifiable in a common public script for anger. But the circulation of the script through verbal discourse also exerts identifiable forces.

**Linguistic Predispositions of Shared Anger**

In the 20th century, language use came to be widely understood not as a mere conveyer of ideas, but rather as an active process whose structure exerted force on human interactions. Multiple theorists have identified at least three major structural features of language use.

First, because language works by creating categories, it heightens essentialization. In public rhetoric, such essentializing is pushed toward totality or “absolutizing” because rhetors compete for public attention and acclaim. If a moral law is good, then the absolute or pure form of the law will tend to appear as best within language’s essentializing frame. The rhetor who is most vehement and total in their support for the law will thus tend to appear as the vessel of the essence of that good.

With some emotions, there are internal constraining forces on essentialization. For example, compassion includes the appraisal condition, “ability to help,” which balances against the empathic identification with the other’s pain, thus constraining total identification. With anger, however, the appraisal elements and action tenden-
cies cohere in the direction of totalization. There is no internal constraint. Indeed, when significant constraints exist (i.e., a lack of certainty or control), anger tends to shift to other emotions (especially fear or sorrow).

The second structuring feature of language use that amplifies anger is binarism. The meaningfulness of language has been shown by diverse theories to be as much a product of its internal structuring by binary relations as of the qualities of the phenomena to which language may seek to refer. Thus, “up” has meaning not primarily as an indicator of real places in the world, but fundamentally as an opposite to “down” (which becomes evident for astronauts experiencing zero gravity).

This binary structure aligns with and intensifies the “we” and “they” identified by the appraisal cues of anger. “They” become not merely a violator of a social norm, but representative of “the bad.” The action tendency of “attack” further aligns with and intensifies the oppositional duality. In contrast, in compassion, the necessary moment of empathy blurs the boundaries between “we” and “they,” thereby dampening, rather than intensifying the linguistic binarism.

A third widely recognized structural feature of discourse is its proclivity toward narrative form, the fully elaborated version of which was described by Kenneth Burke as the recounting of an agent, doing an act, in a scene, utilizing agencies, for a purpose. The appraisal cues for emotions described by psychologists, anthropologists, historians, philosophers, and others tend to fill these narrative components. Consequently, the sharing of appraisal cues in public discourse favors a script that is responsive to the interactions among the appraisal cues, the action tendencies, and the structuration dynamics of discourse. Angry public rhetorics therefore tend to circulate in variations on this script:

1) they (an absolutely antagonistic agent, identified as a long-standing enemy),

2) acted to cause serious harm (serious in terms of the normative claim being made),

3) to us (the model protagonist),

4) in violation of crucial social norms (or morals),

5) so we must attack!

Angry Rhetorics of 9/11

These tendencies of angry rhetoric are well-illustrated in the public discourses surrounding “9/11” circulated by Osama bin Laden, President George W. Bush, and

12 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969 (first published 1945)), along with many other theorists.
Susan Sontag. The focus on bin Laden and Bush as opposed warriors should be obvious. Sontag was the most visible representative of an alternative ideology, one that aspired to a peaceful global trajectory. Given the differences in goals, cultures, social positions, and ideologies, the commonalities among these three rhetorics cannot be attributed to those factors. Instead, their alignments conform to the dynamics of sharing public anger. I illustrate these alignments by comparing the attack action tendency in the three rhetorics and then summarize similarities in other elements.

**Attack!**

United States’ President George W. Bush has been widely condemned for his choice to respond to the vivid and violent attacks by a small network of men on the World Trade Center and the U.S. Pentagon on September 11, 2011 with a war against an indefinite roll-call of nations. To gain support for war, Bush responded to multiple intense emotions already circulating by ratifying the anger and transforming the fear and sorrow into anger through addresses on September 11th, 14th, and 20th. Polling data show unequivocally that he was able to generate substantial support among the American public for this war.13

The American president’s choice of war has frequently been attributed to his administration’s pre-existing imperialist goals. But in public discourse, the goals of a rhetor are not sufficient explanatory bases. The public must accept, or at least acquiesce to, the publicly articulated motives for the deployment of public resources. The public’s later turn against this war and this president indicates that a shared ideology does not account for their temporary convergence.

The convergence also cannot be accounted for solely by the situation. As many have pointed out, war was not a logical situational response. As the Bush Administration itself recognized with frequent repetitions of the rhetoric, “it’s a new world order,” 9/11 made evident the need for new modes of approach for international terrorists who could turn technologies of daily living into weapons of mass destruction anywhere in the world. War against nation-states was not the obvious answer.

The dynamics of anger better account for the action choice of the President and the nation he led. Sharing anger turned its bearers rotely, energetically, if inappropriately, to the long-standing stereotype: nations attacked go to war! War fulfilled the need for absolutist activation and attack in a maximal way even as the narrowing tendencies of angry cognition precluded engaging the search for information and thought necessary to develop new approaches to the grim novelties of the situation.

Anger produced similarly absolutized attack orientations in the rhetoric of Osama bin Laden. Whether or not one judges that the United States deserved to be the target of anger from Mideastern actors, the rhetoric that bin Laden used to rally

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his followers to undertake that violence was strikingly totalized.

First, the al Qaeda leader argued that his religion demanded permanent war. Violent attack was not a response to a period of oppression (his demand for war spanned the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, multi-dimensional U.S. involvement in the Middle East, and competing figures leading Islamic countries). Instead, violent attack was intrinsic to his vision of the religion. When fomenting or defending the various violent attacks by al Qaeda in places as different as Afghanistan, North Africa, or the United States, bin Laden insisted that each conflict was “merely one of the battles of eternal Islam,”14 and he claimed that “jihad will go on until the Day of Judgment.”15

Second, because attack was constitutive of the religion, piety required sacrifice of all of daily life to forward that war. He chastised listeners, “life, to which the Qur’an, God, and His Messenger are calling you, should be a life of self-respect in this world and victory in the next—a life of jihad for the sake of God Almighty.”16 Those who could not fight were told to donate their worldly belongings and move where they could live under and thereby support the Caliphate (at that time, the Taleban in Afghanistan).17

Third, if to be religious required one to be engaged totally and permanently in violent attack, then one could entertain nothing but hostility for those who were not faithful adherents of his version of Islam. Thus, for example, when asked about leaving Afghanistan, given his exile from his native Saudi Arabia and other Arab or Islamic states in which al Qaeda was fomenting attacks against Islamic governments, he replied “I would rather die than live in any European state. ... Muslims are not supposed to be adjacent to non-Muslim societies.”18 He explicitly defended this rationale as fundamental to the religion, saying:

Don’t they read the Koran, or do they read it, but not ponder it? God says: “Ye believers take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors. They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them [for friendship] is of them. Verily God guideth not a people unjust” [Holy Koran]. He is of them, meaning that he becomes infidel like them.19

17 Interview appearing in Al Jazeera, December (no date given), from Lawrence, Messages to the World, 68.
Bin Laden’s rhetoric thus illustrates an absolute vision of anger-motivated attack: a permanent war, to which all resources must be devoted by the faithful, and absolute separation from the enemy. Such a vision of attack cannot be attributed to the ideology or theology of Islam, as many Islamic-led states have demonstrated. It aligns instead with the motivational resources of a transcendent version of angry rhetoric.

It might not seem too surprising that the warring parties, President Bush and Osama bin Laden, used violent attack in their angry rhetorics. But the rhetoric of Susan Sontag, who claimed to want to eschew war, also vividly embodied the attack orientation of anger. Sontag published what she later called a “howl” in reaction to the 9/11 attacks in the September 24th issue of The New Yorker.20 That statement garnered far more attention than any other progressive’s response to the attacks. David Remnick, the editor, subsequently dubbed them the “famous four paragraphs,” and the Nation described them as unleashing “a torrent of right-wing abuse.”21

Had it been rhetorically well crafted, the visibility and wide circulation of the statement might have allowed her to make some small difference in the rush to war. As she later, hesitantly and partially admitted, however, the statement did not represent her views effectively.22 Compared to her later responses, the limitations of the “howl” were strongly shaped by the dynamics of anger.

Most notably, Sontag’s initial public statement was little more than a vehement attack upon her long-standing enemies. She excoriated the press and US government, while denigrating the US public as unaware and infantalized, lamenting “a robotic President,” castigating “the self-righteous drivel and outright deceptions being peddled by public figures and TV commentators,” calling for investigations of “the ineptitude of American intelligence and counter-intelligence,” and suggesting that the US military might be considered “cowardly” compared to the attackers, because the military “kill from beyond the range of retaliation, high in the sky.” Highlighting the deep pull of old stereotypes, she even compared the US response unfavorably to a “Soviet Party Congress.” The US/Soviet binary, which had been emotionally formative for Sontag’s politicization by the Vietnam war decades prior, was activated by Sontag’s anger, even though the Soviet Union was now defunct.

Anger shaped Sontag’s statement into an attack against her long-standing enemies. Like President Bush, she did not offer creative thinking needed to address the threat at hand. She did not, for example, argue for Americans to work with others to create more effective mechanisms for achieving justice across national lines. That argument could have appealed to Americans because it would have enabled prosecution of the mass murderers who perpetrated the attacks, even as it took away the

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rationale for war against Afghanistan and set in motion mechanisms to forestall Bush’s war against Iraq. Sontag’s “howl” did not even explicitly enjoin her audience against war.

Even if you agree with Sontag’s ideology and share her emotive affiliations, it is untenable to claim that her anger-guided formulation of that ideology served the goals of that ideology well.

And So With the Other Narrative Components

These examples illustrate the distorting pull of sharing public anger upon the public articulation of ideologies by showing how anger’s action tendency of “attack” powerfully shaped prominent narratives surrounding 9/11 regardless of ideology or culture. Similar dynamics shaped the other narrative components. For example, many have observed how both Bush and bin Laden portrayed the agents involved in Manichean terms, as binary opposites representing absolute evil and admirable good. My brief portrait of Sontag’s rhetoric above likewise reveals anger’s push toward intense demonization of “them.”

The demands of public anger also warped the normative bases appealed to by these rhetors, distorting potentially shareable warrants into emotion-laden totems that could not be reciprocally affirmed by the outsiders against whom they railed. Anger also recast the relationships among the in-groups and reshaped the concrete harms into abstract, unrecognizable and unaddressable forms. Regardless of the similar ways in which these different discourses were warped, however, the consequences of the warping were not the same. A rhetoric rallying people to absolute sacrifice for a permanent war was arguably consonant with bin Laden’s goal of establishing a militaristic Caliphate, and it served as well as any to recruit fighters to establish and maintain such a state. In the case of President Bush, however, the alignment of anger’s dynamics with his nations’ goals seems more mixed. The President’s sharing of public anger effectively rallied his nation for war, but if war was an ineffective response, the rally call did not serve the nation’s ends.

If the utility of anger was high for bin Laden and mixed for the American President, it was counter-productive for the goals of cosmopolitan intellectuals such as Sontag. Sontag’s widely circulated statement moved the American public not a centimeter toward reconsidering war-like responses and may have generated some backlash force. What then are the implications for people seeking greater peace, justice, care, or equality around the globe?

Implications

The case studies indicate, and the theory explains, that when publics share anger in a global context, they are powerfully drawn in directions inconsistent with visions that require empathic understandings of others, creative insight, or peaceful interactions grounded in shareable norms. But, if anger is a primary mechanism that humans use for motivating behaviors that adhere to normative regulation of inter-
actions rather than mere coercion, doesn’t that create an impasse?

That impasse can only be resolved by making new conditions real. First, the peoples of the globe need to build platforms to form global publics who can create shared norms that can provide the basis for normative adjudication of global resource distribution. This must involve mutual interaction by ordinary citizens debating real questions with real outcomes, not elite actors in an inaccessible United Nations. Such forums are also required to build the feelings of affiliation necessary for anger to function as an in-group rhetoric.

To move toward that long-term structural project, advocates might find advantage in two changes in their rhetorical efforts. First, when choosing to deploy anger as a rallying device, self-conscious recrafting against the skewing forces identified above will be useful. Second, expanding one’s rhetorical repertoire beyond anger is desirable. While we should continue to listen to our own anger, allowing it to point out behavioral and distributional evils to us, that does not always require sharing our anger as anger with all other publics. Recent work on emotions show there are useful social potentials in other emotions. For example, gratitude seems to motivate sharing.  

Some kinds of joy can enable imaginative thinking.  

Our shared emotions are part and parcel of human being. We cannot, and should not, want to dispense with them. Nonetheless, they bring both good and ill. Because they are enormously complicated, they are probably not “perfectible,” but perhaps we can share them in somewhat better ways. We have reason to hope that each of those bits will ultimately be sufficient to make substantive differences for the well-being of all on our planet.

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Literature


